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Abstract
We revisit the e￿ect of traders’ experience on price bubbles by introducing either
one-third or two-thirds steady in￿ow of new traders in the repeated experimental asset
markets. We ￿nd that bubbles are not signi￿cantly abated by the third repetition of
the market with the in￿ow of new traders. The relative importance of experience to
the formation of bubbles depends on the proportion of new traders in the market. Our
￿ndings identify a market environment where increased experience is not su￿cient to
eliminate price bubbles.
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11 Introduction
Bubble is an important phenomenon because of its possible catastrophic consequence to the
economy and society. Many studies on price bubbles rely on experimental markets that have
the advantage over the real asset markets in measuring the fundamental values of the assets
and thus the price bubbles. Starting from Smith, Suchanek, and Williams (1988), numerous
experimental studies have demonstrated that bubbles and large price deviation exist in a
variety of experimental settings. 1 Another robust ￿nding is that experience in a stationary
market environment can attenuate the divergence of price expectations and reliably eliminate
price bubbles, e.g., Haruvy, Lahav, and Noussair (2007). Dufwenberg, Lindqvist, and Moore
(2005) (DLM, hence forth) ￿nd that, in an environment with a mixture of thice-experienced
and inexperienced traders, even with as small a fraction of experienced traders as one-third,
bubbles are substantially abated.
The e￿ect of experience and learning on bubbles, however, appears very di￿erent in em-
pirical studies. Xiong and Yu (2011) ￿nd no evidence of investor learning in alleviating asset
bubbles, using data from the Chinese warrants market. They split their data sample, which
spans over three years, into two halves that have investors with di￿erent levels of learning,
and ￿nd that the di￿erences between these two subsamples in warrants prices, turnover,
volatility, and the magnitude of violating the fundamental upper bound are insigni￿cant.
Moreover, some studies show that inexperienced investors play an important role in the
formation of price bubbles. Greenwood and Nagel (2009) ￿nd that, using age as a proxy for
experience, around the peak of the technology stock bubble, mutual funds run by younger
managers are more heavily invested in technology stocks than their older colleagues, and
young managers, but not old one, exhibit trend-chasing behavior in their investments.
The di￿erent ￿ndings from the lab and the ￿eld studies might relate to their di￿erences
in the in￿ow of new traders and the composition of traders with di￿erent experience level. In
most of the experimental studies, it is the same set of traders that interact with each other
over time; the experienced traders gain common group experience (Hussam, Porter and
Smith, 2008). Nevertheless, in the real asset market, there is always a continuous in￿ow of
new (inexperienced) traders, especially during the booming period of a market during which
bubbles are also more likely to form. As shown by Seru, Sto￿man and Shumway (2010),
investor attrition is a key factor to understand investors’ learning by trading. The di￿erent
composition of traders may have an in￿uence on traders’ expectations and behavior, and
1For example, Mark Van Boening, Arlington W. Williams, and Shawn LaMaster (1993) employ call
market instead of double auction to decide the trading; King, Ronald R., Smith, Vernon L., Williams,
Arlington W. and Van Boening, Mark V. evaluate the e￿ect of buying on margin and professional traders,
Vernon Smith, Mark van Boening, and Charissa P. Wellford (2000) use assets with constant fundamental
values instead of declining values; Vivian Lei, Charles N. Noussair, and Charles R. Plott (2001) investigate
buy-only and sell-only constraints and the impact of introducing a parallel commodity market; Ernan Haruvy
and Charles N. Noussair (2006) study the impact of short-selling; St￿ckl, Thomas, J. Huber, and Michael
Kirchler (2010) investigate the comparability of di￿erent bubble measures.
2then leads to di￿erent ￿ndings on the e￿ect of experience on bubbles.
In this study, we revisit the relationship between experience and bubbles by investigat-
ing the e￿ect of the steady in￿ow of new traders on the formation of price bubbles, simply
noted as the ￿new-trader e￿ect,￿ in contrast to the experience/learning e￿ect. In particular,
we adopt an experimental design that has a composition of experienced and inexperienced
traders in each repitition of the market, mimicing more closely the real market. Di￿erent
from previous experimental studies, the experienced traders in our study gain experience
through continual interaction with di￿erent new traders. Furthermore, by varying the num-
ber of new traders who enter a market, we can examine the interaction and the relative
importance of the new-trader e￿ect and the classic experience e￿ect.
Our experimental design involves three treatments. In the baseline treatment, similar to
the design in DLM, where new traders only exist in the last repetition of the market. In our
￿in￿ow￿ treatments, denoted as ￿In￿ow 1/3￿ or ￿In￿ow 2/3￿, we replace either 1/3 or 2/3 of
the traders with new traders after each of the repeatedly operated experimental markets,
while keeping a ￿xed group of experienced traders and the same market size.
We ￿nd that, in both in￿ow treatments, bubbles are not substantially abated and most
bubble measures have no statistical di￿erence over the repetition of the asset markets.
On the opposite, in the baseline treatment, bubbles are signi￿cantly abated by the third
repetition of the market and adding new traders in the fourth market does not a￿ect price
bubbles, the same as what DLM have found. These ￿ndings demonstrate that the steady
in￿ow of new traders can sustain bubbles even with the existence of as much as two-thirds
experienced traders in the market.
Naturally, an interesting question is why the steady in￿ow of new traders changes the
pricing dynamics and how the learning e￿ect interacts with the new-trader e￿ect. We ￿nd
that the learning e￿ect is most signi￿cant in the baseline treatment, in which the common
group experience of traders leads to signi￿cant alleviation of bubbles by the third repetition
of the market. In the in￿ow treatments, however, the learning e￿ect has less impact on price
bubbles because of the new-trader e￿ect.
The dynamic patterns of bubbles in the in￿ow treatments depend on the proportion of
new traders in the market. In the ￿In￿ow 2/3￿ treatment, the new-trader e￿ect dominates
the market dynamics and price bubbles are less alleviated than those in the ￿In￿ow 1/3￿
treatment. In the ￿In￿ow 1/3￿ treatment, the variances of price bubbles among sessions
are higher than those in the ￿In￿ow 2/3￿ treatment. This higher variance suggests a more
tight balance between the learning e￿ect and the new-trader e￿ect. In some sessions, the
learning e￿ect is more salient and leads to smaller bubbles, while in others the new-trader
e￿ect plays a more important role and generates lager bubbles.
We also compare the results from our baseline treatment, where a call market is used to
clear the trading and 1/3 of experienced traders are replaced by inexperienced traders in the
3fourth market, with the ￿1/3 inexperienced￿ treatment in DLM which uses a double auction
in trading. We ￿nd that di￿erent market mechanisms have no signi￿cant impact on most
bubble measures and thus the conclusions. However, the trading volume from the double
auction is much larger than that from the call market, which is very reasonable because the
double auction mechanism allows one single asset to be continuously traded for many times.
Thus, only are those measures normalized by the trading volume a￿ected.
Our ￿ndings are complement to those in Hussam, Porter and Smith (2008) who show
that bubble can be rekindled with experienced subjects when imposing a large increase
in liquidity and dividend uncertainty that greatly shock the environment of experienced
subjects. Hence, experience is not robust to major new environment changes in determining
the characteristics of a price bubble. We show that the e￿ect of experience on bubbles also
depends on the ￿ow of new investors.
A recent paper by Deck, Porter and Smith (2011) also investigates the impact of investor
￿ow on price bubbles. They introduce three overlapped generations in a 25-period market
and the market cycles through ￿ve-period sequences of single generation trading and two
generations trading. Because the liquidity increase and decrease along with the entry and
exit of a generation, the market generates an M shaped double-bubble price path. Their
design is very di￿erent from ours in terms of the ￿ow of new traders. In our experiments,
the initial endowment of money and assets is same at the beginning of each market, so the
liquidity does not change with the entry and exit of new traders. Therefore, the pattern
of price bubbles we found is purely due to the particular composition of experienced and
inexperienced traders induced by the ￿ow of new traders.
The interpretation of our ￿ndings relates to the paper by Kirchler, Huber, and St￿ckl
(2011), who ￿nd that the declining fundamental value of the experimental assets confuses
subjects and leads to the high mispricing and overvaluation. Based on their results, the e￿ect
of common group experience in alleviating bubbles might come from the reduced confusion
about the fundamental value process. Our ￿ndings then imply that bubbles are more likely
to form in a market with more confused (new) traders. The ￿ow of new traders can work
together with confusion and/or heterogenous beliefs to sustain bubbles, as suggested by
other studies (Hong, Harrison, and Jeremy C. Stein, 1999; Bloom￿eld, Robert, Maureen
O’Hara, and Gideon Saar, 2009; Palfrey and Wang, 2011).
Our ￿ndings about the role of new traders in the formation of price bubbles have very
important empirical relevance. First of all, the in￿ow of new traders is a salient feature
when a new asset or ￿nancial product is introduced into the market or when there is a
big shock to the market environment. Furthermore, the new environment, together with
the ￿ow of new traders, can create large di￿erences in price expectation and thus are more
likely to generate price bubbles. Many historic bubbles, such as the South Sea bubble and
the Dot-Com bubble, and the recently crashed housing bubble arise from a seemingly new
4market environment or a market with dramatic ￿nancial innovation. Lastly, new traders
might play a even bigger role in the emerging ￿nancial markets that are relatively new and
are becoming more important in the global economy.
2 Experimental Design and Procedures
The parameters in our experimental asset markets follow DLM, which has the closest
research objective as ours. An asset’s life span is ten periods. In each period, it pays a
dividend of 0 or 20 francs, with equal probability. Trade takes place in each period, before
dividends are determined. The dividend process determines the fundamental asset values,
which equals the expected dividend in each period, 10 francs, times the number of dividend
draws remaining.
A session involved four consecutive markets. Each market involved six traders, who
could both buy and sell assets. Each of the six participants possessed an initial endowment
of cash and units of the asset at the beginning of period 1 in each of the four markets. Before
a market opened, half of the traders each started with a cash endowment of 200 francs and
six assets, while each of the other traders started with 600 francs and two assets. The
participants received a table at the beginning of the experiment, describing the expected
value of the asset’s dividend stream at the beginning of each period. An individual’s initial
cash balance and asset inventory at the beginning of period 1 was the same in each market,
and the inventory and balances held at the end of period 10 disappeared after the period
dividend was paid and total earnings for that market were calculated. However, within each
market, individual inventories of asset and cash balances carried over from one period to
the next. The exchange rate was 100 francs to 1 Canadian dollar.
We had three treatments: two In￿ow treatments￿In￿ow 1/3 and In￿ow 2/3￿and the
Baseline treatment. In the ￿In￿ow 1/3￿ treatment, 12 subjects were recruited and partic-
ipated in the training period. After the training period, 8 subjects whose computer ID
was between 5 to 12 were asked to go to the waiting room and would only participate in
one of the four markets, while the other 4 subjects whose computer ID is between 1 to 4
were selected to participate in all the four markets. At the beginning of each market, two
of the 8 subjects in the waiting room were randomly selected to enter the market. They
were replaced by another two inexperienced traders when the market ended. When those
subjects were in the waiting room, they were not allowed to communicate among each other
and were asked to complete as many cross-word puzzles and Sudoku puzzles as possible.
They did not make any earnings by doing the puzzles, so that we controled the income of
the inexperienced traders when they entered the market. They were given an additional
￿xed payment of 15 dollars for compensation of time. The ￿In￿ow 2/3￿ treatment is similar
to the ￿In￿ow 1/3￿ treatment, except that 18 subjects were recruited, subject 1 and 2 par-
5ticipated in all the four markets and the other 16 subjects participated in only one of the
four markets. The baseline treatment is similar to the one-third treatment in DLM. There
are 8 subjects in total for each session. In the fourth market, two experienced subjects who
had participated in the ￿rst three markets were replaced by two new inexperienced subjects.
When new traders entered a market, their initial endowments are the same as those who
exited the market, so the total liquidity remains the same.
Di￿erent from DLM, we used a call market (as in for example Friedman, 1993; Van
Boening et al., 1993; Cason and Friedman, 1997) instead of a double auction market. The
market was implemented by the z-Tree software (Fischbacher, 2007). 2 In a call market, all
bids and asks for a period are submitted simultaneously, aggregated into the market demand
and supply curves, and the market is cleared at a uniform price for all transactions of that
period.3 The adoption of a call market design allows us to compare our results with those
in DLM and test whether the conclusion of DLM is robust to the market format.
In each period, each participant had an opportunity to submit one buy order and one
sell order to the market. An individual’s submitted buy order consisted of only one price
and a maximum quantity the individual was willing to purchase at that price. Similarly,
his sell order consisted of only one price and a maximum quantity the individual o￿ered
to sell at that price. Individuals did not observe any other agent’s orders for the period
when submitting their own orders. After all of the participants submitted their decisions,
the computer calculated the market price, the lowest equilibrium price in the intersection of
the market demand and supply curves constructed from the individual buy and sell orders.
Participants who submitted buy orders at prices above the market price made purchases,
and those who submitted sell orders at prices below the market price made sales. Any ties
for last accepted buy or sell order were broken randomly. Participants were not permitted
to sell short or to borrow funds.
The information provided to each individual at the end of each period consisted of
the market price, the dividend, the number of units of asset he acquired and sold, his
current inventory of the asset, the cash he received from sales and spent on purchases,
his current cash balance, and the cumulative earnings for the session. For inexperienced
subjects, the cumulative earnings for the session is the total earnings from the market that
they participate in. Before subjects submit their buy and sell orders, the computer screen
displayed the previous price history the subject had experienced. For experienced subjects,
prices from all previous periods in all markets were displayed. For inexperienced subjects,
only prices from all previous periods in the market they participated in were displayed.
2Our z-Tree program is developed based on that posted by Haruvy et al. (2007) on the website of AER.
3 See Sunder (1995) for more detailed discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of call market
versus continuous double auction design.
6The experiment took place in the Bell economic experimental lab in CIRANO in Mon-
treal between May to July 2011. Subjects are undergraduate students from the universities
in the Montreal area. No subjects had prior experience in similar experiments and all sub-
jects participated in only one session. All sessions lasted less than 2.5 hours, including the
￿rst 45 minutes during which the experimenter read the instructions and trained the par-
ticipants in the use of the market software. At the end of the experiment, participants were
privately paid, in cash, the amount of their ￿nal cash holdings from all markets they had
participated in, in addition to the show-up fee of $5. All inexperienced traders were paid
an additional ￿xed payment of $15. 4
3 Results
The main di￿erence between the in￿ow and baseline treatments lies in the ￿ow of new
traders over the repitition of the asset market. In the in￿ow treatments, experienced traders
are always interacting with di￿erent new traders; in the baseline treatment, experienced
traders interact with the same group of traders in the ￿rst three markets. Moreover, the
experienced traders in the in￿ow treatments always have an asymmetric information advan-
tage over the inexperienced traders, such as on the trading prices in previous markets. The
experienced traders and inexperienced traders might respond di￿erently to such asymmet-
ric information. Such responses might a￿ect the dynamics of bubbles, as shown in Sutter,
Huber and Kirchler (2011).
We expect that, price bubbles in the in￿ow treatments have less changes over the repe-
tition of the market, comparing to those in the baseline treatment; in other words, bubbles
are not or less substantially abated. Our conjecture is mainly based on the ￿new-trader
e￿ect￿, that is, the composite impact generated from the continuous entry of new traders .
Overall, a steady in￿ow of new traders naturally makes each repetition of the market close
to a new market and reduces the existence of experience and its e￿ect on price bubbles. The
more new traders the market has, the less e￿ective the experience is. At the same time, in
the market with continuous in￿ow of new traders, the experienced traders may learn less
about the market and the pricing pattern, since the market has more uncertainty and is less
predictable.
Previous studies indicate that the thrice repeated market is enough to alleviate bubble,
so we ￿rst investigate whether it is true for both baseline and in￿ow treatment. Our ￿rst
hypothesis compares the measures of price bubbles in the ￿rst and the third market. The null
hypothesis is that bubble measures in market 1 and market 3 are similar; the alternative
hypothesis is that the magnitude of bubbles is smaller in market 3, when traders gain
experience. The comparison between market 1 and market 4 show have similar results. We
4Although some inexperienced traders waited for a longer time and others waited for a shorter time, we
choose to pay them the same amount in order to control the wealth when they enter the market.
7expect that the null hypothesis will be more likely to be supported in the in￿ow treatments,
but the baseline treatment will be more in favor of the alternative hypothesis. Moreover, if
we introduce more new traders after each repetition, we expect that bubbles are less abated.
Our second hypothesis then compares the magnitude of bubbles in market 3 and market
4. In both baseline and in￿ow treatment, new inexperienced traders enter the fourth market.
For the baseline treatment, following DLM, we expect no di￿erences between market 3 and
market 4 for the Baseline treatment, with the alternative hypothesis that the magnitude
of bubbles is larger in market 4. For the in￿ow treatment, we expect less alleviation in
price bubbles across the markets and no di￿erences between market 3 and market 4, with
the alternative hypothesis that the magnitude of bubbles is larger in market 3 since the
experienced traders gain more experiences when staying longer in the market.
In the following sections, we ￿rst show the observed dynamics of asset prices and measure
the extent of price bubbles￿the deviation of prices from fundamental values. Based on the
bubble measures, we quantify and test statistically the di￿erences in bubbles across the
repetition of the markets. We then investigate the interaction of the learning e￿ect and the
new-trader e￿ect in sustaining or abating bubbles. Lastly, we demonstrate the impact of
call market and double auction on our analysis.
3.1 Summary Statistics
Figure 1 describes the prices in each period averaged over all sessions, along with the funda-
mental values of the asset in the same period. First, price bubbles in both in￿ow treatments
are less alleviated across the repeatedly operated asset markets, comparing to those in the
baseline treatment. This observation supports our null hypothesis. Second, the average
prices in the in￿ow 2/3 treatment are lower than those in the in￿ow 1/3 treatment and are
more under-valued. This observation is related to the continuous in￿ow of a relatively large
proportion of new traders, since prices are more likely to be under-valued in a market with
more new ￿confused￿ traders. In order to provide more rigorous analysis, we will use the
standard bubble measures to conduct quantitative assessment and statistical tests on the
di￿erences in price bubbles from di￿erent markets in di￿erent treatments. 5
Following the literature (King et al. (1993), Van Boening et al. (1993), Porter and Smith
(1995), Noussair and Tucker (2003) and Dufwenberg et al. (2005)), we use the following
measurements to capture the extent of price bubbles.
 The Normalized Absolute Price Deviation: the sum, over all transactions, of the abso-
lute deviations of prices from the fundamental value across the ten periods, normalized
5In Figure 3-5 in Appendix B, we also show that the transaction price in each period of each market in
each session, along with the fundamental value, respectively for each treatment. The pricing patterns are
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Figure 1: Observed Mean Prices and Fundamental Values
by the total number of shares outstanding. It equals
(
P
t qtjpt   ftj)=(100  TSU);
where qt is the number of transactions in period t and the total stock of units TSU = 24
is the sum of all traders’ inventories of asset. 6
6We divide by 100*TSU while some other studies simply divide by TSU to calculate Normalized Absolute
Deviation and Turnover. The purpose is to make our measure comparable to previous studies. Previous
studies calculated the normalized deviation in terms of dollars (units of 100 cents). Our prices and funda-
mental values are in terms of frans (cents). Therefore, the appropriate measure for comparison with previous
studies would be in units of 100 francs.
9 The Normalized Average Price Deviation: the sum of the absolute deviation between
the transaction price and the fundamental value across the ten periods, normalized by
the total number of shares outstanding. 7 It equals
(
P
t jpt   ftj)=(100  TSU):
 The Price Amplitude: the di￿erence between the maximum and minimum mean price
deviations from fundamental value across the ten periods, normalized by the initial
fundamental value. It equals
maxtfpt   ftg   mint fpt   ftg
f1
; t = 1;2;:::;10;
where pt and ft equal the average transaction price and the fundamental value in
period t, respectively (in our experiment f1 = 100.)8




Table 1 presents the mean and standard deviation of bubble measures for the four markets
in each treatment, where the calculation is based on the prices from all sessions of each
treatment. Previous studies have documented that the e￿ect of experience on prices appears
signi￿cantly by the third repetition of the market, so our focus is to compare the measures
for market 1 and market 3. Similar as seen from Figure 1, bubble measures are substantially
abated in the baseline treatment; but they are less abated in the in￿ow treatments, and some
measures even increase in the in￿ow 2/3 treatment. Also, most of the bubble measures in
the in￿ow 2/3 treatment are smaller than those in the in￿ow 1/3 treatment.
Another salient feature is that the between-session variances (standard deviations) of the
bubble measures in the ￿In￿ow 1/3￿ treatment are much larger than those in both baseline
and ￿In￿ow 2/3￿ treatments. This might re￿ect the relative weight of the learning e￿ect and
the new-trader e￿ect in determining trading behavior and prices. When these two e￿ects
have a tight balance and neither of them can dominate the market, as in the ￿In￿ow 1/3￿
treatment, we might see higher variances in price bubbles across di￿erent sessions. On the
7This de￿nition is similar to the Total Dispersion in Haruvy et al. (2007), which is de￿ned as
P
t jpt ftj.
The above Normalized Average Price Deviation measure is also similar to the Relative Absolute Deviation
(RAD) in Stock et al. (2010), which is normalized by the total periods and average fundamental value.
8In Haruvy et al. (2007), it is de￿ned as (maxtfpt   ftg   mintfpt   ftg)=ft. Using Haruvy et al.’s
de￿nition of Price Amplitude (denoted as Price Amplitude 2 in Table 3 and 4 in Appendix B) does not
change our statistical result. This de￿nition is also similar to the Relative Deviation (RD) in Stockl et al.
(2010), but the Relative Deviation (RD) is further normalized by the average fundamental value.
10Table 1: Mean and Variance of Bubble Measures for Market 1-4 (Averaged over Sessions in
Each Treatment)
(Between-session standard deviation shown in parentheses)
Market 1 Market 2
Measure Baseline In￿ow 1/3 In￿ow 2/3 Baseline In￿ow 1/3 In￿ow 2/3
Normalized Absolute 0.407 0.560 0.325 0.343 0.289 0.333
Price Deviation (0.190) (0.395) (0.100) (0.207) (0.133) (0.107)
Normalized Average 0.114 0.138 0.096 0.096 0.098 0.085
Price Deviation (0.029) (0.072) (0.013) (0.026) (0.038) (0.016)
Price 0.928 1.028 0.726 0.814 0.754 0.710
Amplitude (0.198) (0.352) (0.148) (0.224) (0.182) (0.101)
Turnover 1.467 1.475 1.325 1.142 1.092 1.292
(0.495) (0.568) (0.283) (0.478) (0.340) (0.230)
Market 3 Market 4
Baseline In￿ow 1/3 In￿ow 2/3 Baseline In￿ow 1/3 In￿ow 2/3
Normalized Absolute 0.202 0.296 0.329 0.205 0.321 0.214
Price Deviation (0.125) (0.184) (0.151) (0.122) (0.408) (0.082)
Normalized Average 0.075 0.108 0.084 0.061 0.110 0.070
Price Deviation (0.016) (0.085) (0.020) (0.020) (0.117) (0.026)
Price 0.700 0.848 0.748 0.494 0.790 0.544
Amplitude (0.099) (0.552) (0.197) (0.208) (0.776) (0.086)
Turnover 1.083 1.125 1.317 1.067 1.000 1.275
(0.320) (0.355) (0.398) (0.395) (0.355) (0.253)
opposite, in the baseline and the in￿ow 1/3 treatments, the market structures are more
stable in the sense that either new-traders or experienced traders dominates the markets,
so the pricing presents a relatively more uniform pattern.
Overall, the summary statistics show that learning of experienced traders seems to have
the largest impact on bubble alleviation in the baseline treatment, where learning comes
from the interaction with a ￿xed group of traders. For the in￿ow treatments, when the
market has more inexperienced traders, such as in the in￿ow 2/3 treatment, the new-trader
e￿ect is dominating; when the market has more experienced traders, such as in the in￿ow
1/3 treatment, the learning e￿ect of experienced traders and the new-trader e￿ect work
together in sustaining asset bubbles.
3.2 Statistical Tests on Bubbles Alleviation across Markets
In this section we report the Permutation tests on how price bubbles change across the
sequence of the markets. Our focus is to test Hypothesis one and two, that is, the bubble
measures are not signi￿cantly di￿erent between market 1 and market 3 and between market
3 and market 4 . Table 2 gives the p-values from the Permutation tests for all bubble
measures. (BL refers to Baseline treatment and IF refers to In￿ow treatment.)
11Table 2: p-value of Permutation Tests
M1 = M3 M1 = M4 M3 = M4
Measure BL IF1/3 IF2/3 BL IF1/3 IF2/3 BL IF1/3 IF2/3
Normalized Absolute 0.031 0.094 0.531 0.031 0.031 0.094 0.438 0.563 0.219
Price Deviation
Normalized Average 0.031 0.063 0.219 0.031 0.156 0.063 0.938 0.531 0.219
Price Deviation
Price 0.031 0.156 0.656 0.031 0.188 0.094 0.969 0.313 0.094
Amplitude
Turnover 0.063 0.188 0.500 0.031 0.063 0.438 0.563 0.313 0.406
In the baseline treatment, most of the tests reject the null hypothesis that M1 = M3
at 5% signi￿cance level. The only exception is the test using Turnover, which rejects the
null hypothesis at 6% signi￿cance level. These results provide strong evidence that asset
bubbles are alleviated substantially when traders gain enough common group experience,
by the third repetition of the markets.
On the contrary, bubbles in the in￿ow treatments are not alleviated substantially from
market 1 to market 3. In both In￿ow 1/3 and In￿ow 2/3 treatments, none of the tests
using di￿erent measures can reject the null hypothesis at 5% signi￿cance level. Only the
Normalized Absolute Price Deviation and the Normalized Average Price Deviation in the
In￿ow 1/3 treatment can reject the null hypothesis at 10% signi￿cance level. Hence, these
tests overall do not suggest there is a signi￿cant change in price bubbles from market 1 to
market 3.
For all treatments, there are no statistical di￿erences in price bubbles between market 3
and market 4 (except that Price Amplitude is marginally di￿erent at 10% signi￿cance level
in ￿In￿ow 2/3￿ treatment). The result for the baseline treatment suggests the same ￿nding
as in DLM: after traders earn enough experience (thrice-experienced), the introduction of
new traders will not cause the bubbles to return.
Comparing the ￿In￿ow 1/3￿ and ￿In￿ow 2/3￿ treatments, the no-alleviation result in
price bubbles (M1 = M3) is more salient in the ￿In￿ow 2/3￿ treatment, according to the
level of the statistical signi￿cance. This suggests that more new traders in the market help
sustain bubble. However, the no-di￿erence tests between market 3 and market 4 have lower
signi￿cant level in the ￿In￿ow 2/3￿ treatment than in the ￿In￿ow 1/3￿ treatment, especially
for the price amplitude. These two ￿ndings suggest that the experienced traders in the
￿In￿ow 2/3￿ treatment need more repetition to learn about the market.
When we compare the testing results for market 1 and market 4, the markets in the in￿ow
treatments seem more e￿cient, although statitistically there are no signi￿cant di￿erence.
This suggests that it might take more time to make experience has e￿ect on price bubbles,
when there is a steady in￿ow of new traders.
12We also did the tests on the di￿erences among market 2, 3 and 4. We also ￿nd evidences
supporting that bubbles are signi￿cantly abated in the baseline treatment, but not in the
in￿ow treatments. For instance, the tests using Normalized Average Price Deviation and
Price Amplitude show that price bubbles are signi￿cantly alleviated from market 2 to market
3, and from market 2 to market 4; but not for the in￿ow treatments. The test using Turnover
shows that there is more turnover across the markets in the baseline treatment, but no
di￿erence in the In￿ow treatments. The test using Normalized Absolute Price Deviation
only shows di￿erences from market 1 to market 4 in the baseline treatments, but not in the
in￿ow treatments.9
3.3 Experienced and Inexperienced Traders
In understanding the systematic di￿erences in price bubbles between the baseline and the
in￿ow treatments, the role of experiences are crucial. So in this section we investigate the
payo￿s and the trading behavior of experienced and inexperienced traders.
As seen from Figure 2, the comparison on earnings between the experienced and inex-
perienced traders shows that the average earnings of experienced traders are systematically
higher than those of inexperienced traders, except in the ￿rst market. 10 This ￿nding sup-
ports that learning and experience play a role in the experimental asset market. However,
such role seems most important in the baseline treatment. In the in￿ow treatments, some of
the statistical tests on the di￿erences in earnings of experienced and inexperienced traders
are not signi￿cant.
In ￿In￿ow 1/3￿ treatment, the trading volume is higher for experienced traders than
inexperienced traders. For other treatments, the trading volumes among experienced and
inexperienced traders have no clear di￿erence, which might be related to the market mech-
anism we are using. In the call market, the total trade volume is much smaller than in
the double auction market, so there is much smaller room to generate di￿erences in trading
volume for experienced and inexperienced traders.
3.4 Impact of Market Mechanisms
One question of our interest is how the market institution a￿ects the pricing bubble, given
the same market parameters. Using Robust Rank Order test, we compare our Baseline
treatment with the corresponding 1/3 inexperienced-trader treatment in DLM. We ￿nd
9For the between-subject comparison, we did the robust rank order tests on the di￿erence in price
bubbles for the same markets from di￿erent treatments and ￿nd no signi￿cant di￿erence. The intuition
is that bubble measures in the in￿ow treatment on average are bigger but also have higher variance than
those in the baseline treatment, so the rank-based robust order tests cannot distinguish such di￿erences.
We suspect that, if we adopt a market parameterization with more traders, more trading periods and more
uncertainty on the dividends, the di￿erences between treatments may become more signi￿cant.
10For the ￿rst three markets, the calculation uses data from the in￿ow treatments. For the fourth market,





























































Figure 2: Average Earnings of Experienced and Inexperienced Traders
(In￿ow Treatment)
that Normalized Average Price Deviation and Price Amplitude is not signi￿cantly di￿erent
between these two treatments. However, the Turnover is 1% signi￿cantly higher in DLM
than in our Baseline treatment (actually the measure of Turnover in any session in DLM
is higher than in any session in our Baseline treatment), which suggests that the double
auction market produces a much higher level of trade transaction. The average Turnover in
our Baseline is 1.19, as contrast to 4.64 in DLM. Haruvy et al. has the average Turnover
1.73, which is still higher than ours but much closer. The di￿erence in Turnover also leads to
a signi￿cant di￿erence in Normalized Absolute Price Deviation ( p < 0:5 one-tailed Robust
Rank Order test). This comparison implies that the ￿ndings in DLM are robust to the
change of market mechanism.
4 Conclusions
Using an experimental design with a steady in￿ow of new traders in a sequence of experi-
mental asset markets, we ￿nd that bubble sustains and has a signi￿cantly di￿erent trend,
14comparing to the design that only introduces new investors in the last asset market. We
demonstrate that the in￿ow of new investors does play an important role in the formation
and change of price bubbles. The new-trader e￿ect work together with the learning e￿ect
in determining the market dynamics. The relative importance of these two e￿ects depends
on the proportion of new traders in the asset market.
The experimental literature on price bubbles has the robust ￿nding that experience has a
strong e￿ect in alleviating bubbles in a stationary environment and such e￿ect can dominate
the impact of inexperienced traders in a setting with even a small fraction of experienced
traders. However, experience alone is not a su￿cient condition to eliminate bubbles, as
shown in Hussam, Porter, and Smith (2008). We compliment to this strand of literature by
showing that when there is a continuous in￿ow of new traders, the role of experience could
be more complicated.
This paper provides some cues on the contrasting ￿ndings from the experimental and
empirical studies, related to the importance of experience and learning in the formation of
price bubbles. It is possible that learning might not have e￿ect on bubbles when there is
a steady in￿ow of new traders, which is very likely to be the case in Xiong and Yu. Pan
and Shi (2011) also use data from Chinese warrant market and ￿nd that the entry of new
investors help sustain price bubbles. The importance of new traders and their interaction
with experienced traders echos those empircal ￿ndings in Greenwood and Nagel (2009) and
Seru, Sto￿man and Shumway (2010).
Further studies could investigate the role of the in￿ow of new traders in the formation of
price bubbles by incoporating other factors that are essential elements in asset pricing, such
as information, beliefs, and the heterogeneity of investors. For example, Sutter, Huber and
Kirchler (2011) introduce asymmetric information into the market and ￿nd that it alleviates
price bubbles. The di￿erent information of traders essentially leads to di￿erent composition
of investors, which has similar feature to our design. It might be interesting to show how
asymmetric information could play a role when there is a steady in￿ow of new traders.
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17Appendix A: Instructions for experiment (In￿ow treat-
ment)
1. General Instructions
This is an experiment in the economics of market decision making. The instructions
are simple and if you follow them carefully and make good decisions, you might earn
a considerable amount of money, which will be paid to you in cash at the end of the
experiment. The experiment will consist of several sequences of 10 trading periods in
which you will have the opportunity to buy and sell in a market. The currency used
in the market is francs. All trading will be in terms of francs. The cash payment to
you at the end of the experiment will be in dollars. The conversion rate is 100 francs
to 1 dollar.
2. How to Use the Computerized Market
In each period, you will see a computer screen like the one shown below. You can use
the interface to buy and sell Shares. At the top of your computer screen, in top left
corner, you can see the Money and Shares you have available.
 
At the beginning of each trading period, if you wish to purchase shares you can send
in a buy order. Your buy order indicates the number of shares you would like to buy
18and the highest price that you are willing to pay. Similarly, if you wish to sell shares,
you can send in a sell order. Your sell order indicates the number of shares you are
o￿ering to sell and the lowest price that you are willing to accept. The price at which
you o￿er to buy must be less than the price at which you o￿er to sell. The price you
specify in your order is a per-unit price, at which you are o￿ering to buy or sell each
share.
The computer program will organize the buy and sell orders and uses them to deter-
mine the trading price at which units are bought and sold. All transactions in a
given period will occur at the same trading price. Generally, the number of shares
with sell order prices at or below this clearing price is equal to the number of shares
with buy order prices at or above this clearing price. The people who submit buy
orders at prices above the trading price make purchases, and those who submit sell
orders at prices below the trading price make sales.
Example of how the market works: Suppose there are four traders in the market
and:
 Trader 1 submits an o￿er to buy at 60
 Trader 2 submits an o￿er to buy at 20
 Trader 3 submits an o￿er to sell at 10
 Trader 4 submits an o￿er to sell at 40
At any price above 40, there are more units o￿ered for sale than for purchase. At
any price below 20 there are more units o￿ered for purchase than for sale. At any
price between 21 and 39 there is an equal number of units o￿ered for purchase
and for sale. The trading price is the lowest price at which there is an equal
number of units o￿ered for purchase and for sale. In this example that price is
21. Trader 1 makes a purchase from trader 3 at a price of 21.
3. Speci￿c Instructions for This Experiment
The experiment will consist of four independent sequences of 10 trading periods. In
each sequence, there are 6 traders in the market. Before the start of the ￿rst sequence,
four of you, whose computer number is between 1-4, will be selected to participate in
all the four sequences. The other 8 individuals will only participate in one of the four
sequences. If your computer number is between 5-12, you will be asked to go to the
waiting room after the training period and will be randomly selected to participate
in one of the four sequences. You will not be doing anything connected with this
experiment when you stay in the waiting room.
At the beginning of the sequence, half of the 6 traders will have an endowment of 6
shares and 200 francs and the other half will be endowed with 2 shares and 600 francs.
19In each period of a sequence, there will be a market open, operating under the rules
described above, in which you are permitted to buy and sell shares. Shares have a
life of 10 periods. Your shares carry over from one trading period to the next. For
example, if you have 5 shares at the end of period 1, you will have 5 shares at the
beginning of period 2.
You receive dividends for each share in your inventory at the end of each of the 10
trading periods. At the end of each trading period, including period 10, each share
you hold will pay you a dividend of 0, or 20, each with equal chance. This means
that the average dividend for each share in each period is 10. The dividend is added
to your money balance automatically after each period. After the dividend is paid at
the end of period 10, the market ends and there are no further earnings possible from
shares in the current market.
A new 10-period market will then begin, in which you can trade shares of a new asset
for 10 periods. If you are selected to participate in all the four sequences, the amount
of shares and money that you have at the beginning of the new market will be the
same as at the beginning of the ￿rst 10-period market. There will be four 10-period
markets making up the experiment.
4. Average Holding Value Table
You can use the AVERAGE HOLDING VALUE TABLE in front of you to help
you make decisions. It tells you how much, on average, each share will pay you in
dividends if you hold it from now until the end of the 10-period market.
The ￿rst column indicates the current period. The second column gives the average
earnings from each unit that you keep in your inventory for the remainder of the 10-
period market. It is calculated by multiplying the average dividend in each period,
10, by the number of periods remaining, including the current period.
5. Price History
In each period, when you send in a buy order and/or a sell order, you can observe your
previous trading prices. If you are selected to participate in all the four sequences, you
will observe all the previous trading prices formed in each period of each sequence. If
you are selected to participate in one of the four sequences, you will observe all the
previous trading prices formed in each period of the sequence that you participate in.
6. Your Earnings
Your earnings for a 10-period market will equal the total amount of cash that you
have at the end of period 10, after the last dividend has been paid. It is calculated in
the following way:
20The money you have at the beginning of period 1
+ the dividends you receive
+ the money received from sales of shares
- the money spent on purchases of shares.
If you are selected to participate in all the four sequences, your earnings for the entire
experiment will equal the total earnings from all the four sequences of the 10-period
markets that make up the experiment, plus $5 show-up fee.
If you are selected to participate in only one of the four sequences, your earnings for
the entire experiment will equal the total earnings from the sequence that you have
participated in, plus $15 ￿xed payment, plus $5 show-up fee.
21AVERAGE HOLDING VALUE
PER SHARE































































































































































































































































Figure 5: Transaction Price in Each Period, All Markets and Sessions in ￿In￿ow 2/3￿ Treat-
ment
25Table 3: Various Measures, By Market and Session, in In￿ow Treatment
Session
Market I1/3_1 I1/3_2 I1/3_3 I1/3_4 I1/3_5 I2/3_1 I2/3_2 I2/3_3 I2/3_4 I2/3_5
Normalized absolute price deviation
1 1.206 0.351 0.473 0.605 0.168 0.173 0.425 0.405 0.298 0.325
2 0.391 0.351 0.226 0.083 0.393 0.180 0.336 0.360 0.478 0.310
3 0.568 0.244 0.067 0.242 0.358 0.231 0.250 0.556 0.198 0.410
4 1.048 0.150 0.102 0.197 0.109 0.313 0.249 0.199 0.222 0.088
Normalized average price deviation
1 0.265 0.111 0.123 0.090 0.102 0.078 0.103 0.103 0.085 0.108
2 0.130 0.143 0.081 0.050 0.088 0.073 0.099 0.085 0.101 0.064
3 0.255 0.072 0.040 0.070 0.105 0.098 0.056 0.101 0.070 0.097
4 0.317 0.071 0.037 0.061 0.063 0.068 0.078 0.106 0.065 0.033
Price amplitude
1 1.60 0.75 1.10 0.75 0.94 0.490 0.740 0.850 0.700 0.850
2 0.79 0.89 0.78 0.44 0.87 0.600 0.810 0.730 0.800 0.610
3 1.80 0.57 0.43 0.60 0.84 0.800 0.490 0.900 0.600 0.950
4 2.15 0.30 0.29 0.58 0.63 0.580 0.660 0.500 0.550 0.430
Price amplitude-2
1 4.600 2.350 6.500 2.100 2.190 1.388 2.856 3.550 2.400 4.000
2 6.656 3.440 1.740 1.222 2.490 1.613 3.300 1.650 2.400 2.350
3 14.400 0.820 0.663 1.500 3.050 3.050 1.117 2.500 1.300 1.790
4 8.750 0.990 1.129 1.590 0.855 1.300 0.940 1.000 0.722 1.240
Turnover
1 1.833 1.375 1.333 2.167 0.667 0.917 1.500 1.667 1.292 1.250
2 1.208 0.833 1.000 0.792 1.625 1.000 1.125 1.375 1.583 1.375
3 1.042 1.500 0.583 1.125 1.375 0.958 1.583 1.875 1.000 1.167
4 1.250 0.792 0.708 1.500 0.750 1.625 0.958 1.292 1.375 1.125
26Table 4: Various Measures, By Market and Session, in Baseline Treatment
Session
Market B1 B2 B3 B4 B5
Normalized absolute price deviation
1 0.591 0.621 0.315 0.319 0.188
2 0.663 0.365 0.283 0.313 0.090
3 0.270 0.312 0.050 0.295 0.083
4 0.220 0.371 0.081 0.260 0.091
Normalized average price deviation
1 0.113 0.133 0.153 0.088 0.085
2 0.114 0.080 0.133 0.078 0.077
3 0.090 0.093 0.067 0.067 0.058
4 0.071 0.085 0.042 0.068 0.038
Price amplitude
1 0.98 1.19 1.01 0.75 0.71
2 0.95 0.70 1.14 0.60 0.68
3 0.80 0.81 0.65 0.65 0.59
4 0.61 0.70 0.16 0.55 0.45
Price amplitude-2
1 5.300 6.590 2.400 1.600 3.000
2 5.450 4.300 1.504 0.800 1.580
3 2.400 3.400 0.950 2.000 1.390
4 2.400 1.900 0.800 0.667 0.800
Turnover
1 1.917 2.000 0.833 1.417 1.167
2 1.708 1.500 0.583 1.167 0.750
3 1.208 1.250 0.708 1.458 0.792
4 1.208 1.667 0.625 0.875 0.958
27Table 5: Average Earnings by Experienced and Inexperienced Traders
(All Sessions and All Markets, in Dollar)
Market 1 Market 2 Market 3 Market 4
Session exp. inexp. p-value exp. inexp. p-value exp. inexp. p-value exp. inexp. p-value
BL1 7.20 N/A 6.40 N/A 8.00 N/A 8.15 7.70
BL2 8.00 N/A 8.80 N/A 6.40 N/A 8.51 6.98
BL3 10.40 N/A 10.40 N/A 8.00 N/A 7.29 7.02
BL4 7.20 N/A 9.60 N/A 7.20 N/A 11.67 7.87
BL5 8.80 N/A 8.80 N/A 10.40 N/A 8.14 7.72
avg. 8.32 N/A 8.80 N/A 8.00 N/A 8.75 7.46 0.031
IF1/3_1 8.12 7.77 7.09 9.82 7.58 6.45 12.34 6.53
IF1/3_2 8.07 7.86 7.43 6.74 11.05 9.11 8.37 9.66
IF1/3_3 6.87 7.87 9.92 4.16 9.04 8.32 6.44 6.33
IF1/3_4 9.72 6.96 9.81 9.18 11.76 7.69 9.30 7.80
IF1/3_5 7.96 8.08 7.75 6.10 8.71 4.18 8.03 7.95
avg. 8.15 7.70 0.313 8.40 7.20 0.250 9.63 7.15 0.031 8.90 7.65 0.156
IF2/3_1 6.19 6.51 7.00 6.10 11.52 9.84 7.11 4.85
IF2/3_2 4.26 7.47 6.60 6.30 5.48 8.06 7.03 8.49
IF2/3_3 6.97 8.52 6.91 6.15 8.13 5.54 8.05 9.18
IF2/3_4 7.95 6.83 16.39 7.41 7.85 5.68 8.96 6.32
IF2/3_5 6.52 8.74 7.59 5.81 6.17 6.52 6.25 7.68
avg. 6.38 7.61 0.938 8.89 6.35 0.031 7.83 7.13 0.281 7.48 7.30 0.438
Table 6: Average Trade Volume by Experienced and Inexperienced Traders
(All Sessions and All Markets)
Market 1 Market 2 Market 3 Market 4
Session exp. inexp. p-value exp. inexp. p-value exp. inexp. p-value exp. inexp. p-value
BL1 7.67 N/A 6.83 N/A 4.83 N/A 2.75 9.00
BL2 8.00 N/A 6.00 N/A 5.00 N/A 6.75 6.50
BL3 3.33 N/A 2.33 N/A 2.83 N/A 1.88 3.75
BL4 5.67 N/A 4.67 N/A 5.83 N/A 4.00 2.50
BL5 4.33 N/A 2.50 N/A 2.67 N/A 3.25 4.00
avg. 5.80 N/A 4.47 N/A 4.23 N/A 3.73 5.15 0.844
IF1/3_1 7.88 6.25 5.13 4.25 5.00 2.50 5.25 4.50
IF1/3_2 7.63 1.25 3.63 2.75 6.88 4.25 3.38 2.75
IF1/3_3 5.50 5.00 3.13 5.75 2.75 1.50 3.00 2.50
IF1/3_4 11.88 2.25 4.50 0.50 4.50 4.50 6.13 5.75
IF1/3_5 3.13 1.75 6.00 7.50 5.50 5.50 3.00 3.00
avg. 7.20 3.30 0.031 4.48 4.15 0.406 4.93 3.65 0.125 4.15 3.70 0.063
IF2/3_1 3.25 3.88 3.75 4.13 4.00 3.75 4.00 7.75
IF2/3_2 5.25 6.38 2.50 5.50 7.00 6.00 2.25 4.63
IF2/3_3 9.75 5.13 8.50 4.00 7.50 7.50 6.00 4.75
IF2/3_4 6.00 4.75 6.50 6.25 4.75 3.63 7.00 4.75
IF2/3_5 6.50 4.25 2.75 6.88 5.50 4.25 5.50 4.00
avg. 6.15 4.88 0.156 4.80 5.35 0.625 5.75 5.03 0.063 4.95 5.18 0.625
28